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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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experts engaged in relevant research and resource development tasks. 
Prior to his current duties, he was the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). As 
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$515 billion, with annual supplemental requests of more than $160 billion. He was also responsible 
for developing legislative strategies and developing and implementing DoD financial policy, financial 
management systems, and business modernization programs. In June 2005 Mr. Patterson was 
appointed to lead the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment Project, a comprehensive 
evaluation of every aspect of the Defense Department acquisition system and decision making 
processes. 
From August 2003 to June 2005, Mr. Patterson held duties as The Special Assistant to the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. In the capacity as Special Assistant, Mr. Patterson was responsible for 
managing the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s personal staff as well as providing direction and advice 
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff on a wide range of national security operations and 
policy subjects. He contributed to the Department of Defense support to the United States’ mission to 
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Additionally, Mr. Patterson supported the Deputy Secretary in the areas of military commissions for 
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Before returning to government service, Mr. Patterson was a founding and managing partner at 
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President and Site Manager for Steven Myers and Associates’ support to Lockheed Martin 
Corporation’s winning Joint Strike Fighter competitive proposal preparation. 
Between 1993 and 1999, Mr. Patterson held a variety of responsible, executive positions at 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation (later The Boeing Company), beginning as the Senior Manager for 
Market Research and Analysis on the C-17 military air cargo aircraft and later as Director, 
International Business Development. He was responsible for developing and executing the business 
capture strategy that won U.S. Government Defense Acquisition Board approval to procure 80 
additional C-17s, completing the first contract for 120 aircraft. Mr. Patterson led the Boeing business 
development team that launched the initiative to introduce a commercial version of the C-17; the BC-
17. 
Mr. Patterson served in the Air Force from 1970 to 1993, retiring in the rank of colonel. During that 
time, he held responsible leadership and management positions, with assignments at the air wing 
level as a C-5A aircraft commander and Deputy Operations Group Commander, at major command 
headquarters, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Inspector General. In 1986, Mr. Patterson was the Air Force 
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Abstract 
Cost growth continues to be a serious concern in major acquisition programs.  A 
variety of causes have been identified for cost growth, including low initial cost 
estimates, complex acquisition processes, and immature technologies.  Incentive-
based systems have been employed in an attempt at cost savings, with mixed 
results at best.  This paper examines the role of process and incentive 
characteristics in cost growth.  In particular, we study process concurrency, types of 
incentive contracts employed and the transfer point from cost-plus to fixed-price 
contracts, and the resulting effects on cost growth in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter 
program.  The F-35 program currently is in low-rate initial production.  The emerging 
paradigm of organizational simulation is used in this study, since it combines process 
representations to model acquisition processes and agent representations to model 
multi-actor behavior, including reaction to incentives.  Simulation experiments are 








Cost growth has been a significant problem in major DoD acquisition programs.  A 
recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) notes that, for the fiscal year 
2008 portfolio of weapons systems, there has been cost growth of $296 billion (GAO, 2009).  
In addition, since 2008, GAO (2011) notes that there has been $135 billion in total cost 
growth, $70 billion of which cannot be explained by changes in quantities ordered.  Cost 
growth can result in fewer systems being produced than envisioned or desired (e.g., F-22), 
or in program cancellation (e.g., Navy Area Missile Defense).  In the current and projected 
fiscal environment, there is considerable pressure to rein in cost growth. 
Cost growth is a complex phenomenon involving technical issues, decision-making, 
contractor performance, and uncertainty.  Therefore, it is not easily addressed or sometimes 
even properly understood.  One way to study systems exhibiting uncertainty is computer 
simulation, in which a model of the system to be studied is specified and then analyzed to 
determine the system’s performance with respect to different criteria under different 
conditions.  In computer simulation, experiments can be conducted without using the real 
system, which is advantageous for many types of systems that simply would not be used for 
experimentation.  Here, we are interested in studying acquisition processes, which 
encompass technical issues and technical decision-making, and incentives, which affect 
contractor performance and decision-making. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  The Acquisition Processes, 
Incentives, and Cost Growth section discusses the issues involved in cost growth from a 
process and incentive perspective.  The Model Description section introduces and describes 
a model of the acquisition enterprise using organizational simulation, a relatively new 
paradigm for simulating enterprise systems.  The Experimental Example section presents 
some simulation results illustrating the model concepts.  The final section concludes with a 
discussion on future research. 
Acquisition Processes, Incentives, and Cost Growth 
Cost growth occurs for a variety of reasons, including uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge about technology, design, and manufacturing (GAO, 2009a).  Candreva (2009) 
points to the role of institutional factors in organizational failures such as cost growth.  Our 
previous research has addressed cost by focusing on the process aspects of acquisition.  
For instance, we have demonstrated that evolutionary acquisition processes can yield 
quicker deployment of capability than traditional acquisition processes, but at potentially 
higher cost due to overhead from the increased frequency of development cycles (Pennock 
& Rouse, 2008).  System modularity tends to reduce the overall life cycle cost when 
sustainment is considered and can mitigate higher costs associated with larger production 
levels, thus reducing the effect of cost growth (Bodner, Rahman, & Rouse, 2010).  However, 
such process modeling does not capture the effect of incentives, which can be an effective 
approach to achieving contractor performance, if properly applied (Tremaine, 2008). 
Incentives and contract structures potentially play an important role in cost control.  
The two main types of contract structures are cost-plus, in which the government reimburses 
the contractor for costs incurred and pays an additional amount for profit, and fixed-price, in 
which the government pays a fixed price for a set deliverable (e.g., number of systems).  
Typically, the particular type of contract structure is used based on the risk profile of the 
program.  Programs associated with high levels of research and development tend to use 
cost-plus contracts, since research and development entail significant risk for the contractor.  
Cost-plus contracts shift that risk to the government.  Fixed-price contracts, on the other 
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hand, are used for production, in which costs are more certain.  Fixed-price contracts shift 
risk to the contractor. 
Incentives traditionally have been implemented via such contract mechanisms as 
cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) or cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF).  An incentive fee rewards 
cost control, while an award fee rewards performance related to non-cost outcomes.  
Outcomes may relate to system capabilities (e.g., speed, altitude) or targets over time, such 
as the emerging concept of performance-based logistics (Kratz & Buckingham, 2009).  
Award fees may be structured to occur within certain evaluation periods, and a rollover may 
be used to transfer an unearned fee to a future period in which it can be earned.  
Competition, as opposed to non-competition, can also be considered as an incentive for a 
contractor (Birkler et al., 2001), although use of competition is constrained in areas such as 
aircraft acquisition, due to industry consolidation (Birkler et al., 2003).  An award fee 
structure for spiral development of software-intensive systems is presented by Reifer and 
Boehm (2006). 
The fundamental idea is to tie the incentive to the desired outcomes.  This has not 
always worked in practice, however.  A recent GAO report finds that the current DoD 
practice of using award and incentive fees is ineffective (GAO, 2005).  Award fees often are 
provided despite the contractor's not having met performance criteria, and incentive fees 
have not been shown to motivate contractors to control costs.  In addition, DoD does not 
have a system to allow sharing of case studies demonstrating successful use of award or 
incentive fees. 
Recent studies have addressed increasing the effectiveness of award fees and 
incentive fees.  Using an analytic approach, Hildebrandt (2009) develops guidelines for 
effective decision-making and information availability structures applied to incentive 
contracts.  Under some arrangements, the information required may be demanding.  Four 
programs are examined by Gilbreth and Hubbard (2008) to develop recommendations for 
effective incentive use.  These recommendations include adequate training and feedback, 
plus several specific recommendations for award fees (using a base fee, setting the award 
fee based on outcomes rather than time, relating the award fee to the outcomes achieved, 
and using rollovers judiciously).  These results are confirmed and extended by a 
continuation of the study that examined 25 programs (Tremaine, 2008). 
Consider the F-35 program, which is developing and producing three variants of a 
next-generation tactical fighter for three Service applications (Air Force, Navy, and Marines).  
This program currently is in low-rate initial production (LRIP).  The program has seen 
significant cost growth and schedule slippage (GAO, 2009b).  There are a variety of causes 
cited, including immature technologies in development, ongoing design changes, inefficient 
production processes, and incomplete testing (GAO, 2011).  Concerns due to the cost of the 
program have caused the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform to 
recommend significant reductions in quantities to be procured (NCFRR, 2010) and have 
also prompted discussions of cancelling the Marine variant (short takeoff and landing).  
Nevertheless, the program has recently entered into its fourth phase of LRIP with a switch 
from a cost-plus contract to a fixed-price contract. 
In addition, the F-35 program is of interest due to the highly distributed nature of the 
design and production network of contractors.  In previous aircraft programs (e.g., F-16), the 
aircraft was largely designed and built by the prime contractor, with sourcing of somewhat 
simple components from suppliers.  With the F-35, major subsystems are sourced for design 
and production to other contractors, many of which are international (Kapstein, 2004).  
Hence, the problem of government’s incentivizing the contractor really becomes more 
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complex, as the prime contractor, in the role of lead systems integrator (LSI), must in turn 
incentivize partners and other contractors. 
The intent here is not specifically to study the F-35 program but rather to study the 
interaction of process and incentive issues raised by the program in the context of cost 
growth. 
Model Description 
This research uses the emerging paradigm of organizational simulation (Rouse & 
Boff, 2005) to study the problem of acquisition cost growth.  Traditional simulations used to 
study organizations can be divided into three major paradigms: discrete-event (Law & 
Kelton, 2000), system dynamics (Sterman, 2000), and agent-based (Hillebrand & Stender, 
1994).  Discrete-event simulation tends to emphasize the transactional nature of process-
based systems.  System dynamics, on the other hand, represents continual accumulation 
processes affected by feedback flows and lags.  Both are suitable for studying process-
based systems, depending on the particular level of model resolution and focus.  Agent-
based simulation is relatively new and emphasizes the interaction of actors in a system.  
Thus, it has seen significant use in social science research applications.  Of interest here is 
its application to economic behavior. 
Organizational simulation uses elements of these three paradigms to model process 
and actor behaviors in organizational systems.  It has been used in several domains thus 
far, including research and development investment (Bodner & Rouse, 2007), health care 
delivery (Rouse & Bodner, 2009), and computer server design and development (Bodner, 
Mutnury, Cases, & Rouse, 2009). 
Process Model 
Per DoD acquisition policy, acquisition is divided into a number of phases whereby a 
program evolves from concept to deployed systems.  These phases consist of concept 
refinement, technology development, system development and demonstration, production 
and deployment, and operations and support.  Various milestones and reviews exist in the 
process and serve as gates through which the program must have made sufficient technical 
progress to pass.  As the program progresses, costs are incurred and are monitored against 
estimated costs.  In addition, at various points in the process, contracts are awarded that 
cover specific deliverables relative to an acquisition phase.  At these points, the amount of 
the contract, the deliverables, and the structure of the contract are in play.  The process 













Possible contract renegotiations  
Figure 1. Acquisition Processes 
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Note that sometimes concurrency occurs, especially between system testing (in 
system development & demonstration) and low-rate initial production (in production and 
deployment).  While this can expedite system delivery, it also entails risks, since 
manufacturing an unproven system may entail redesign and rework if undiscovered flaws 
exist.  This risk relates directly to potential cost growth. 
Actor Model 
The actor model consists of the set of actors, their behaviors, and their interactions 
with one another.  The government is one actor, and then contractors are modeled as 
separate actors. 
Given that we are interested in incentives, we use the principal-agent framework as 
the basis for modeling actor interactions.  The principal-agent framework is used in micro-
economics to model the interaction of two actors, one of which (the principal) utilizes 
another (the agent) to perform a task (Kreps, 1990).  This framework introduces a number of 
problems such as moral hazard and information asymmetry.  Typically, the principal must 
design a contract mechanism that works to motivate the agent and hopefully addresses any 
problem situations. 
In the case of acquisition, the government serves as the principal and the prime 
contractor as its agent.  In turn, other contractors may be agents to the prime contractor’s 
role as principal.  In a complex supply network, the principal-agent representation can be 
used to model the many different tiers of contractors that exist, as shown in Figure 2.  Note 
that a contractor can be an agent to multiple other contractors.  Sometimes this is known to 
the principals; other times, it is not known.  In addition, a contractor may be an agent to 
multiple contractors located in different programs (i.e., different supply networks under 
different prime contractors, who may be competitors).  Thus, the principal-agent relations in 
a real supply network can be quite complex.  Such complexity is usually not solvable by 










G = Government 
P = Prime contractor 
C = Contractor 
 
Figure 2. Actor Network 
Incentive Model 
Here, we describe a simplified incentive model that can serve as the basis for a 
principal-agent model of acquisition.  Assume that the government is the principal and that 
the prime contractor is its agent.  The agent has a utility function representing value 
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received from working for the principal.  We assume a functional form as shown in Equation 
1, where U represents the utility, w represents the contractual payment from principal to 
agent (with diminishing marginal returns), and a represents the effort expended by the 
agent.  In the case where there is no contract, the agent maintains a reservation utility Ur. 
     (1) 
To simplify, we assume that the agent can expend a high level of effort ah or a low 
level of effort al during the contractual term.  Obviously, ah > al.  Now suppose that the 
principal and agent enter into a performance-based contract whereby the agent is paid 
according to its performance during the period.  Again, for the sake of simplicity, we assume 
three levels of performance (low, medium, and high).  Payment is as follows. 
 The agent is paid x02 if performance is low. 
 The agent is paid x12 if performance is medium. 
 The agent is paid x22 if performance is high. 
Obviously, x0 < x1 < x2.  The performance is uncertain, but it is based in part on the 
level of effort expended by the agent.  Let P(a) be the performance level achieved by the 
agent as a function of effort, and assume that there are three levels of performance—P0 
(low), P1 (medium), and P2 (high) —with P0 < P1 < P2.  We model the performance according 
to the following functional form. 
  (2) 
 (3) 
The terms  and  represent, respectively, probabilities associated with mapping 
the agent’s effort (low or high) to performance outcomes.  Even if the agent expends high 
effort, there is a probability of low or medium performance.  We assume, however, that low 
effort is more highly correlated with low performance than with high performance and vice 
versa.  Thus, we assume that  and . 
With regard to the contractual agreement, there are three scenarios.  The agent can 
decline the contract, the agent can accept the contract and expend low effort, or the agent 
can accept the contract and expend high effort.  In the former case, the agent’s utility is 
simply the reservation utility Ur.  In the latter two cases, the agent’s expected utility is given 
in Equation 4. 
   (4) 
The contract can be viewed from the perspective of either the principal or the agent.  
The principal, of course, wants the agent to expend maximum effort so as to maximize the 
chance of high performance.  On the other hand, the principal does not want to overpay the 
agent.  Thus, one way in which the principal’s objective can be stated is to minimize the 
payment subject to the condition that the agent expends high effort. 
    (5) 
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From the agent’s perspective, the only value from expending high effort occurs when 
the expected utility from high effort is greater than both the reservation utility and the 
expected utility of expending low effort.  That is, 
     (6) 
    (7) 
Combining Equations 5–7 yields a constrained optimization problem, which is 
solvable if the values for parameters are known and fixed. 
Cost-Plus Model 
As the agent works on behalf of the principal, it incurs costs for effort.  We assume, 
in general, that the cost incurred at over time horizon t during a particular acquisition phase 
has a fixed set-up cost a0 and then is linear in time with respect to a constant burn rate m, 
where m is dependent on the level of effort and where t is measured from the beginning of 
the phase. 
      (8) 
From a cost-plus perspective, for the agent to be interested in the contract, payment 
from the principal must cover the agent’s cost and then provide a profit.  Moreover, the utility 
from the principal’s payment and the agent’s cost (Equation 1) must be greater than the 
agent’s reservation utility. 
In cost-plus arrangements, the duration of the acquisition phase can be estimated 
but often varies from the estimate, driving cost growth.  Ideally, the principal desires that the 
agent expend high effort, expecting performance to be high.  From this, the principal can 
estimate the time remaining in an acquisition phase, as well as a cost. 
Let T be the total completion time needed for an acquisition phase.  Let  be the 
initial estimate for time remaining (i.e.,  is an estimate for T), and let  be the remaining 
left for completion at time t (i.e., once the phase has commenced).  At the end of each year 
t, the time remaining can be updated as follows, where the agent’s performance is 
measured in time progression toward completion. 
     (9) 
Note that the phase would end when reaches zero for some t, at which time T 
becomes known.  Assuming that the principal pays the agent annually for the contract 
duration, the principal’s cost ct in year t can be computed. 
  (10) 
Let CT be the total cost to the principal for the acquisition phase, and let  be the 
estimate for CT at time t.  Letting Ct be the cost incurred by the end of year t, total costs can 
be tracked and the estimated phase cost can be updated. 
      (11) 
    (12) 
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Letting  be the initial estimate of costs to be incurred by year t (t = 1, 2,… ) 
allows incremental cost growth to be measured as  and total cost growth to be 
estimated as . 
Fixed-Price Model 
Suppose that the principal uses a fixed-price contract for the agent’s work.  We 
assume a firm fixed-price contract, rather than an instrument that allows some cost to be 
transferred from the agent to the principal.  Hence, cost growth is not an issue for the 
principal.  This situation typically occurs in production, where there is less outcome risk.  
Here, economies of scale are usually present.  In micro-economics, economies of scale are 
modeled using a Cobb-Douglas production function (Kreps, 1990).  Let X be the amount of 
input resources, in terms of labor, capital, and materials; N be the output in terms of number 
of units produced; and b be the scale factor.  The fundamental relation between input and 
output is shown in Equation 13. 
      (13) 
If b > 0, then there are increasing returns to scale, meaning that the production is 
more efficient as more units are produced.  This discussion assumes application in 
production, although the model may be extended to other phases.  Assuming a constant 
per-unit cost of input B, the total cost of the production phase can be modeled as follows: 
     (14) 
The term  is defined as the production efficiency.  The production efficiency 
is the performance measure used for the agent, and the unit cost of input is the level of 
effort.  Similar to the cost model, we use three different levels—α0 (low), α1 (medium), and 
α2 (high)—with α0 < α1 < α2 (lower α implies better efficiency).  Similar to the cost model, the 
effort has two levels: Bl (low effort) and Bh (high effort).  A higher effort may involve, for 
example, more investment per unit of labor in training or per production line in precision 
machinery, with the intent to achieve better downstream efficiency.  Thus, Bh > Bl.  Note that 
there may be a fixed cost associated with effort that is not modeled here.  Equations 15 and 
16 relate performance to effort in a probabilistic framework as before, with  and 
. 
  (15) 
 (16) 
If the agent chooses to enter into a fixed-price contract with the principal, where Y is 
the per-unit output price, the agent then must choose what level of effort to expend based 
on the expected gain G(B), which is a function of payment from the principal and costs 
associated with production and with effort. 
   (17) 
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The agent selects the level of effort whereby  is maximized.  However, this 
formulation does not address two of the principal’s concerns regarding the contract—the 
selection of an appropriate value of Y and the timely delivery of output units.  The 
performance measure α is primarily of interest to the agent unless it can be translated into 
schedule performance.  Two methods of doing this are using a discounted cash flow model 
for the payments and costs and applying penalties to the payments when the schedule is 
not met.  These methods are the subject of current work. 
Simulation Implementation 
A simulation model using the preceding constructs has been implemented using an 
organizational simulation framework.  This framework uses AnyLogic, a commercially 
available simulation software product, plus a set of customized classes to model 
organizational artifacts and behaviors (Bodner, 2009).  This allows actors to be modeled 
using an agent-based approach and acquisition processes to be modeled using a discrete-
event, process/transactional approach.  The interaction of these two approaches is shown in 


















Figure 3. Process-Actor Interaction 
This paper focuses on the implementation of a principal-agent model and an 
associated cost model within one acquisition phase.  Each year within the phase, the 
following occur: 
 The agent determines its level of effort. 
 Based on the level of effort and the probabilities, a value for the performance 
level is computed. 
 The principal’s cost incurred is updated with the relevant cost from the year in 
question. 
 Based on the cost incurred, cost growth is measured. 
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 The estimated time to completion is updated based on the performance for 
the year. 
 The estimated cost for the acquisition phase is updated. 
 Cost growth for the acquisition phase is estimated. 
 The principal and agent interact, with new probabilities being generated. 
At present, we assume that the contract structure and amount are not renegotiated. 
Experimental Example 
This section describes example simulation results from the cost-plus incentive model 
described in the Model Description section.  The model features a principal and an agent 
that interact annually over a particular acquisition phase.  At each interaction, the 
probabilities for agent performance change.  Cost accrual is tracked, as is time taken to 
complete the phase by the agent. 
Parameters 
Tables 1–4 contain parameters used in the simulation example. 
Table 1. Probability of Performance 
Low Effort High Effort 
Low Medium High Low Medium High 
0.6 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.6 
 
Table 2. Principal’s Cost Based on Performance 
Low Median High 
100 200 400 
 
Table 3. Agent’s Cost 
Low effort High Effort 
50 150 
 
Table 4. Other Parameters 
Est. Phase Duration (Yrs.) Interaction Frequency Reserve Utility 










To model changes in the probabilities ( ) associated with achieving a certain 
performance level given a level of effort, we use two methods. 
 Random assignment.  Each is assigned a new value from the Uniform (0, 
1) distribution, subject to the earlier constraints (  and 
). 
 Random addition.  Each is assigned a new value by adding a random 
amount to the previous value.  The new value is , 
where r = 0.1.  This simulates a random walk process.  The same constraints 
are observed, as well as the constraint that . 
Example Results 
Using the random assignment of probabilities, the following results are obtained, as 
shown in Figure 4.  The initial phase duration estimate of ten years was proven to be 
incorrect, since the phase lasted fifteen years.  The estimated cost remained relatively 
constant, and the final cost ($3,800) was within a 95% confidence interval for the mean of 
the estimated total costs from each year ($3,727, $3,982). 
 
Figure 4. Cost Accrual Using Random Assignment 
Under random addition, the following results are obtained, as shown in Figure 5.  
Similar to the previous example, the initial estimate for phase duration was incorrect, with 
the actual value being twelve years.  The actual cost of $3,600 was likewise within a 95% 








Figure 5. Cost Accrual Using Random Addition 
In the second case, there is less variation in the probability values across time as 
compared to the first case.  This is due to the probability update mechanism of the second 
(random addition), which changes the probabilities within a smaller range than the first.  This 
is due to the relatively small value of r.  Thus, in the first case, the agent can switch much 
more readily between low effort and high effort, while in the second case, the switch occurs 
less often.  Thus, we see that this type of variability can drive longer phase durations. 
In both examples, there is little to no cost growth.  This occurs largely due to three 
reasons.  First, the payment differential between high performance and low performance is 
relatively large.  This motivates the agent to expend high effort.  A smaller differential would 
likely cause increased expenditure of low effort (at relatively higher cost), resulting in cost 
growth.  Second, the example does not use an initial cost estimate derived independently 
from the estimate used during program performance.  Such independent estimates may be 
artificially low.  Finally, technical issues are not modeled that would tend to drive cost growth 
(e.g., immature technologies, production quality issues).  These issues have been 
demonstrated in previous work (Bodner et al., 2010). 
Discussion and Future Research 
This paper has presented a model for the acquisition enterprise that addresses its 
process-oriented aspects, as well as incentives for the actors involved.  The incentive model 
is derived from the principal-agent model used in micro-economics.  The acquisition model 
has been implemented using an organizational simulation framework.  Sample results are 
presented to demonstrate the behavior of a government principal and a prime contractor 
agent. 
Current work addresses the scale-up of the model to more realistic acquisition 
situations and the integration of more detailed process models (which cover the multi-phase 
acquisition life cycle and associated technical drivers of cost growth) with the actor models.  
Of primary interest are programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.  In this program, cost 
growth has been an issue, due to technical process issues and due to incentives.  In 
addition, the F-35 employs a systems integrator paradigm of acquisition in which the prime 
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contractor integrates complex subsystems designed and produced by a network of other 
contractors.  This paradigm is relatively new, since it was preceded for many years by the 
manufacturer paradigm, in which most design and production were performed by the prime 
contractor, with relatively simple subsystems contracted out according to the prime’s 
specifications.  It is increasingly being used in acquisition of complex systems by the DoD 
and the industry (e.g., Boeing Dreamliner).  The systems integrator paradigm implies the 
need for extensive research in incentives and contract structures.  Due to the complexity of 
supply networks, simulation will be a valuable tool in this type of research. 
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